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This paper examines the factors affecting farmers’ participation in an agri-
environmental scheme (AES) in marginal areas implying few changes in the traditional 
farm management (environmental fallow). The enrolment theoretical micro-economic 
model reveals that farmers` (extrinsic) factors as well as decision makers’ (intrinsic) 
factors are important for farmers’ participation, without disregarding the role of social 
capital. The farm and farmer characteristics (intrinsic factors) as well as the influence of 
the social capital have been tested trough the specification and estimation of an adoption 
model for dry-land marginal farmers in Granada (southern Spain). 300 farmers with 
cereal dry-land specialization have been surveyed in order to identify factors 
influencing their enrolment decision and to derive scheme design modifications to 
improve the AES success, understood as participation rate. 
Due to the fact that the effects of applying this measure do not have significant 
effect on the food and animal production, the participation decision is hypothesized to 
be mainly driven by the farmers’ attitude reflecting the importance of the social capital 
in order to educate farmers. Nevertheless, AES interaction with other agricultural 
policies, such as LFA compensatory payments, restraints the possibility of this scheme’s 
success specially when these payments imply greater financial resources. Further 
research is needed to see whether this same pattern holds when considering AES 
implying a more intensive change in the farm management.  
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A. INTRODUCTION 
In the EU context, focus of agricultural policy is shifting from food and fibre 
production towards its multifunctional role in the wider rural world, providing inter alia 
environmental goods and services, food safety, social cohesion and cultural heritage 
(Baéz  et al., 1999). This shift has occurred driven both by social pressure and 
international trade liberalization needs, a shift which gained public attention during the 
CAP reform of Agenda 2000 and the following mid term review.  
From an economic point of view, multifunctionality as a policy objective or an 
argument in favour of public intervention as such, is based in solid concepts such as 
joint-production, externalities and market failure when considering the multifuncional 
outputs of agriculture (Atance and Tió, 2000). As a result of these three attributes, 
market equilibrium cannot be considered as the optimum outcome and public 
intervention is needed. Among the many potential policy instruments available, agri-
environmental policy is one of the most widespread in the developed world and in the 
EU framework is characterised by voluntary multi-annual agreements with flat-rate 
payments which promote positive externalities (i.e. extensification measures) and the 
reduction of negative externalities (input-use reduction in intensive agriculture). 
Following Hanley et al. (1999) success or failure of agri-environmental policy 
should be evaluated combining both ecological and economic efficiency. Due to the 
uncertainty surrounding joint-production relationships as well as ecological indicator 
selection and the high costs associated with their quantification, adoption rate has been 
the most widely used measure of success. Even though this measure overestimates 
programme achievements, as some of the outputs could have been obtained even in the 
absence of such policy (Smith and Weinberg, 2004), we consider that while further 
scientific and technological base is achieved and taking for granted that policy design is 
efficient in so far requirements assure outputs, adoption rates are valid indicators.  
Due to the voluntary nature of this policy instrument, the decision process by which 
farmers enrol in agri-environmental schemes and factors influencing this decision is a 
key issue that needs to be considered when designing these schemes. Our objective is to 
identify the main factors guiding farmers’ behaviour with regards to low-requirement 
agri-environmental measures in order to assist with policy design, in particular 
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on non-monetary attributes of policy design and farmer’s characteristics, attitudes and 
believes, leaving aside policy design based on non flat-rate payments such as contract 
auctions (Latacz-Lohman, 1998) which will be considered in future developments of the 
current research agenda undertaken in our Institute.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first review agri-environmental 
policy development in the EU and then introduce a theoretical model for farmers’ 
uptake of such measures, focusing on prior research as far as individual factors’ 
influence is regarded. Following, the agri-environmental measure under consideration 
(environmental fallow), the study area and the survey instrument are described prior to 
the presentation of the application of the theoretical model to our case study. The paper 
ends with some conclusions, policy implications and directions for further research. 
 
B. AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU 
Agri-environmental policy in the EU dates back to the establishment of 
“accompanying measures” (together with the early retirement scheme, less favoured 
areas scheme and forestation of agricultural land) under the McSharry reform in 1992. 
Regulation 2075/92 states that agri-environmental schemes’ objectives were: a) 
reduction or stabilization of production levels, b) assure farmers’ income and c) 
improve the quality of the environment. Most programmes designed under this 
regulation opt for limiting polluting input use (such as fertilizers), thus encouraging less 
intensive production systems, as the strategy to achieve the above-mentioned objectives 
(Salhofer and Glebe, 2006). Programmes are voluntary and have a multi-annual nature 
(5 years). Compensation payments are based on costs borne by farmers when 
undertaking the prescribed measures as well as reduced income due to production 
decrease, with a discretional 20% increase considered as an incentive for increasing 
participation. These payments are reflected in Annex II of the WTO Uruguay 
Agreement as they are considered to be non trade distorting (Directorate General for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, 2005). Co-financing by the Unions is set at 75% 
for objective 1 regions and 50% for other regions.  
Agri-environmental measures should imply tighter requirements than Good 
Agricultural Practices (GAP, which have been introduced in the framework of cross-
compliance) due to the application of the “polluter pays principle” by which, private 
  2actors should bear the costs of avoiding or restoring damages to the environment
1. The 
degree of implementation of Regulation 2075/92 and its follow-ups (Regulation 
1257/99 for Agenda 2000 and Regulation 1698/2005 for the Rural Development 
Program 2007-13 ) varies widely among Member States both regarding the scope of 
measures designed and the proportion of UAA involved (Van Huylenbroeck and 
Whitby, 1999). While Austria, Finland and Luxembourg have more than two thirds of 
the UAA involved in agri-environmental measures; in  Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the 
Netherlands and Spain the coverage is just a mere 5% of their total UAA (Salhofer and 
Glebe, 2006). 
EAGGF-Guarantee funds devoted to agri-environmental schemes (AES) during the 
2000-2006 programming period amount to 13,906 MEUR, with Spain receiving 
approximately 6.4% of the overall budget (894 MEUR) (DG AGRI, 2006). Financial 
importance of the AES steadily increased during the 1993-1999 period and has now 
stabilized at around 2,000 MEUR per annum. Although the figure can seem large, it 
only represents 4% of EAGGF-Guarantee funds, but it accounts for nearly 50% of all 
rural development expenditure coming from this fund in the EU-15, a figure that 
declines drastically in the case of Spain to a mere 20%. This trend is reversed however 
in Andalusia where 79% of total EAGGF-Guarantee funds devoted to rural 
development are channelled through AES (in the case of Granada, this figure is reduced 
to 48% but nevertheless, the figure is more than twofold the Spanish average). 
In Spain programmes currently in force are set up in Royal Decree 4/2001. 
Programmes can be grouped under eight horizontal concepts which include: 
extensification, organic agriculture, crop rotation, landscape/nature, autochthonous 
varieties and breeds, input reduction and other actions. The distribution of AES funds 
among concepts is reflected in Graph 1. Andalucía, and Granada as part of it, show a 
strong predominance of two measures (landscape/nature and organic farming), measures 
which are also concentrated in permanent crops (mainly olive trees), crops that account 
for 85% and 71% of all contracts signed under these concepts (MAPA, 2005). 
Extensification represents nearly 15% of all funds in Spain and in the case of Granada, 
the environmental fallow is the only available measure under extensification accounting 
for 45% of all measure payments in Andalucía.  
                                                 
1 From a property rights point of view, agri-environmental schemes assume that farmers have the right to 
undertake any production method in so far as it complies with GAP while society has the right to prevent 
any production method not complying with GAP.  
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Source: Own calculation with data from Ministry of Agriculture and AES managing authority  
 
Nowadays, 28% of all area under AES in Spain is located in Andalucía receiving 
23% of total expenditure. The province of Granada receives annually 4.6 MEUR as 
AES payments, close to 15% of total payments in Andalucía. The province of Granada 
receives annually 4.6 MEUR as AES payments, close to 15% of total AES payments in 
Andalucía. 
 
C. A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR EXPLAINING THE ADOPTION OF AES 
Factors affecting farmers’ individual decision to enrol in AES can be grouped in 
four main categories (Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). Programme (type of measure, 
compensation paid, application costs, etc.) and market (food and environment demand) 
characteristics are two groups of extrinsic factors while farm (size, crop portfolio, etc.) 
and farmer (age, education, etc.) characteristics are intrinsic factors. 
If we consider environmental provision by farms (QE) to be represented by the 
following function:  () E E E Q Z X g Q ≥ = , , where XE are the variable inputs devoted to 
environmental production, Z the quasi-fixed inputs (labour, land, etc.) which are 
devoted indistinctly to food and fibre or environmental production and  E Q the minimum 
provision of environmental outputs
2 which is a pre-condition for being eligible for agri-
environmental payments.  
Then, farmer’s decision can be considered at a micro-economic level as a 
maximization problem where farmers maximize their utility (U) which is comprised of 
two variables: profit (π) and environmental provision (QE); 
                                                 
2 This amount could be associated with good agricultural practices (GAP), needed to receive the single 
farm payment (Council Regulation N 1782/2003 and Commission Regulation N 796/2004).  
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Subject to the following restrictions: 
( ) ( ) Z r X X w Q p Z X f p F E E E F F ′ − + ′ − ′ + ′ ≤ , π  
0 ≥ E X  
[2]   
 
Where  , and w’ are the price vectors for food and fibre products, 





F inputs devoted to food and fibre 
production; and r´ the unit cost of quasi-fixed inputs.  
A farmer has to select his production level by combining XE and XF in order to 
maximize his utility which as shown in equation [1] is affected by profit and 
environmental good provision. Restriction [2] states that farmer’s profit is restricted by 
food and fibre income and participation in AES (where price is compensation paid by 
the managing authority) and production costs.  
This model implies the following relationships: 
a)  Higher food and fibre prices ( F p′ ) reduce input use for environmental provision 
(XE) as relative productivity of environmental provision decreases and, 
therefore, environmental provision (QE) decreases too.  
b)  Higher AES payments ( E p′ ) and/or higher marginal utility of environmental 
provision increase QE. 
c)  Lowering costs or efforts of programme participation (expressed as input 
requirements for environmental provision) also increases QE. 
d)  The higher the prices of food and fibre inputs the higher the provision of 
environmental goods (QE). 
If the AES payment ( ) is not introduced in the model presented, the above-
presented model reflects that participation is not only based on farm characteristics, as 
farmer characteristics enter the model through the utility function (U).  
E p′ E Q
Previous research has tested the effect of many of these variables on farmer 
participation in AES (QE provision). Programme characteristics are not considered in 
our study as we are centred in one single measure with homogenous attributes for all 
farmers, but mainly payment levels (Wossink and Van Wenum, 2003; Vanslembrouck 
et al., 2002; Van Huylenbroeck and Whitby, 1999) and contract duration (Wilson, 
1997) are the main aspects which have been studied empirically while monitoring and 
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with special focus on risk aversion. Market characteristics, although described in many 
cases (i.e. Gómez-Limón and Atance, 2004) have not been considered in enrolment 
decisions.  
As far as farmer characteristics are concerned, there is a wide consensus regarding 
younger farmer participation (Wilson and Hart, 2000; Mathijs, 2003; Morris and Potter, 
1995; Bonnieux et al., 1998; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Paniagua, 2001; Jongeneel et 
al., 2005). Nevertheless, when the AES is focused on extensification (as in our case 
study) older farmers are more prone to participate (Potter and Lobley, 1992; Drake 
1999) as this type of AES require less labour and does not request new investments 
either in capital and/or knowledge which are the main reasons for deterring older 
farmers from participating. In this sense, in the evaluation of an extensification 
programme in Spain, Paniagua (2001) concludes that part-time farmers also tend to 
participate more often in programmes which require less involvement. The same 
conclusion has been obtained by Mathijs (2003) related to the willingness to adopt a 
countryside stewardship scheme in Belgium. In a research made by Jongeneel et al. 
(2005) on the adoption of different multifunctional activities by farmers in the 
Netherlands, having an outside job has a negative effect on participation in on-farm 
selling, agricultural services and recreation services due to the fact that these are 
activities that require quite a relative high amount of time and therefore there is less 
time available to participate in off-farm activities. However, an opposite and significant 
effect was found for participation in nature and conservation activities, which require 
less labour contribution. 
Regarding farmer’s education, Delvaux et al, (1999) and Dupraz et al, (2000) 
confirm that a better understanding of AES requirements or a higher environmental 
concern positively affect participation, while formal education is positively related to 
participation in studies undertaken by Wilson and Hart (2000), Delvaux et al. (1999), 
Dupraz et al. (2000) and Drake et al. (1999). On the other hand, a minority of studies 
(Bonnieux et al., 1998; Jongeneel et al., 2005) reach the opposite conclusion although 
the former alerts of collinearity between education and farm size that may have distort 
the coefficients and the latter is justified by the fact that higher education levels allow 
for higher opportunity costs of labour in other sectors. 
Related with education, we can also consider farmer’s attitudes towards the 
environment. Attitudes have been measured using several approaches (Bonnieux et al., 
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chosen, there is consensus regarding the positive relationship between participation and 
farmer’s positive attitude towards the environment. Attitudes towards risk can also have 
an impact on farmer participation, mainly due to income security assured by 
environmental payments (Fraser, 2004). Nevertheless, Slangen (1997) and Sumpsi et al. 
(1998) claim that uncertainty regarding the future of AES and the impact of practices in 
future production ability may hamper participation. Risk aversion has also been 
highlighted as a factor interacting with monitoring and penalty programme 
characteristics (Ozanne et al., 2001).  
An additional attitude that shows divergent effect on participation is that of 
innovativeness, although Willock et al. (1999) detect that pioneer farmers are 
participating more often in AES in Scotland, Wossink and Van Wenum, (2003) do not 
find significant relationships between these two concepts by Dutch arable farmers in 
biodiversity conservation programmes, indicating that farmers associate participating in 
the existing conservation programmes with a traditional, non-innovative way of 
farming. Therefore, this influx is contingent on the degree of change the measure 
introduces into farm management. 
Finally, farm characteristics also affect farmer participation in AES. The most 
important factors considered in previous studies include farm size, property regime and 
farmer’s succession. The latter two factors provide divergent evidence regarding the 
sign of their influx, while size seems to affect positively participation (Wilson, 1997; 
Morris and Potter, 1995; Paniagua, 2001). However participation in some specific 
programmes such as biodiversity conservation schemes seems to be negatively related 
with size (Siebert et al., 2006) and other authors find size not significant when 
analysing farmer participation in AES (Bonnieux et al., 1998; Wynn et al., 2001; 
Wossink and Van Wenum, 2003). Nevertheless, the most significant factor affecting 
participation seems to be prior participation in similar schemes (Potter and Lobley, 
1992; Morris and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 1997; Wilson and Hart, 2001; Drake et al., 
1999) indicating that once a farmer has shifted its technology towards environmental 
goods provision, this provision tends to prevail in the long term as long as the scheme is 
offered.  
A final component affecting participation, and resulting from the interaction of the 
former four can be described as “social capital formation” which results from the 
relationships between farmers, managing authorities, extension agencies and other 
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promotion, which in turn results in higher enrolment. This hypothesis has been 
confirmed by the empirical research undertaken by Mathijs (2003) or Jongeneel et al. 
(2005) in different settings and for different AES.  
To sum up, and quoting the review undertaken by  Siebert et al (2006) based on 160 
studies of AES, “farmers’ decisions are the result of complex social and cultural 
interactions as well as of wider economic and programme design  features”. Our study 
will identify how far these prior finding apply to marginal dry-land areas and low 
requirement programmes.  
 
D. CASE STUDY 
As mentioned above, we want to identify the factors influencing the decision 
whether to enrol or not in the agri-environmental measure “environmental fallow” in 
three counties in the province of Granada (southern Spain). In this section we briefly 
present the main characteristics regarding agricultural production in the area, the AES 
characteristics and the questionnaire used as well as the sample selection.  
 
D.1 STUDY AREA 
The counties of Baza, Huéscar and Guadix are located in the northern high-plain of 
Granada province with an average altitude of 900 m above sea level. The area has a 
high water deficit (300-500 mm per annum) which associated with a high degree of soil 
erosion resulting in low yields (1,000 kg per hectare in dry-land cultivation). All three 
counties are considered as Less Favoured Area (LFA) areas within the EU LFA scheme 
classification.  
The most extended cultivation pattern is that of extensive dry-land cereal (barley) 
following a 50% fallow (“año y vez”) in combination with permanent crops (mainly 
almond and olive trees). Additionally, dry-land farming is associated with ovine 
livestock breeding in a semi-extensive production regime. The total number of sheep in 
the area according to the 1999 Census is 289.609 representing more than 75% of the 
cattle total numbers, with an average herd size of 207 animals. These herds are 
composed mainly of individuals of an autochthonous breed, with production under the 
geographical protected indication (GPI) “Cordero Segureño”. Although the employment 
generation capacity of this ecosystem is not very impressive (it can be considered a low-
input low-output ecosystem), agriculture accounts for 17.8% of total employment in the 
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income support to approximately 70% of all farmers who are dedicated exclusively to 
this activity. Moreover, over 50% of total farmers are above 55 years of age, and 
therefore have little, if any, chances of obtaining employment in other sectors.  
This traditional way of farming generates little environmental impact as the 
extensive production regime implies a minimum use of agro-chemicals which in turn 
favours flora and fauna conservation. This degree of conservation has been recognized 
by the fact that 5 out of the 6 protected natural areas in the province of Granada 
comprise surface within the study area. The combined agro-pastoral land use leads also 
to a sustainable resource use which combined with the predominance of rain-fed 
agriculture (over 85% of all cereals are non-irrigated) do not put additional pressure on 
the limited water resources in the area.  
 
D.2 “ENVIRONMENTAL FALLOW” AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEME 
The AES selected for our case study is the “environmental fallow”. The measure 
is enforced through RD 708/2002 and its positive impacts on the environment are 
related to steppe birds populations caused by the increase of animal feed (due to the 
reduction of fertilizer use that lowers mortality), the increase of winter habitat (due to 
the maintenance of stubble on the field) and the reduction of bird mortality (by banning 
harvesting at night and limiting the ovine density)(CMA, 2005). Main characteristics of 
the AES are reflected in table 1.  
Table 1. Main characteristics of the “environmental fallow” agri-environmental scheme 
Requirements  Holding located in municipalities with fallow index
a higher than 10. 
Minimum uptake surface 1 ha. 
Tier1 
Implementation of a Farm Management Plan 
Keeping stubble on the field for at least 5 months. 
Not using phytosanitary products during the no-cultivation period. 
Livestock limited to 80% of maximum load reflected in GAP (1 
LU/ha). 
Harvesting at night forbidden.   Compromises 
Tier 2 
(add.) 
Cereal stubble must be left on the field on fallow surface. 
Chop and leave straw on the field on at least 50% of fallow surface. 
Livestock grazing period on stubble areas restricted to 3 months and 
the intensity must be controlled in order to avoid leaving bare soil.  
Tier 1  40.87 € per hectare and year.  Compensation 
Tier 2  19.26 € per hectare and year. 
a Fallow index reflects the number of has that must be left idle per 100 has of  “arable COP crops and set-aside”.
Source: own elaboration using data from RD 708/2002 
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characteristics described in the previous section concludes that this AES can be 
characterised as a “low-requirement” measures (Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). The 
“environmental fallow” measure has negligible or none effects of farmers’ utility 
function as its implementation has no high costs and it implies no income loss or novel 
practices to be implemented
3. This is due to the fact that farmers growing cereals in 
non-irrigated lands have to comply with the compulsory fallow index leaving that area 
uncultivated. The only limiting factor, confirmed by our field work, is that of the 
livestock load limitation and the additional costs associated to “chop and spread the 
cereal straw”
4, action needed to apply for the additional Tier 2 payments (42% of our 
sample declares that this task is the one that requires the biggest effort). 
During the 1996-2003 period, expenditure in Granada for the “environmental 
fallow” AES amounts to 1.5 MEUR which represents 12% of total AES expenditure. 
Mean payment is 1,183 € per beneficiary and 39 € per ha, figures that are significantly 
lower than the average payment for AES in Granada (1649 €/beneficiary and 96 €/ha for 
the period 1996-2003 according to Cala Rodriguez, M., 2003). This is not surprising as 
compensation has been calculated as “forgone income” and the most popular measures 
(“erosion control in olive orchards” (50% of all payments) and “organic agriculture” 
(28%)) imply tougher restrictions than this “extensification” measure. Notwithstanding 
the low requirements of this measure, only 4.5% of all eligible land (fallow and non-
occupied lands) has been subject to the “environmental fallow” AES. Our case study 
area comprises 80% of all land under this AES in Granada.  
 
D.3 QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAMPLE SELECTION.  
A total of 300 farmers in the study area have been interviewed. Sample size has 
been allocated discretionally between farmers currently signed-up for the AES (40% of 
total sample) and the rest of cereal dry-land farmers (60%). Our sample of farmers 
under the AES represents 33% of total programme signups in the study area (see table 
2).  
                                                 
3 We do not consider here, due to lack of data, the effect on farmer’s utility related to land environmental 
quality. 
4 The mean cost of chopping the straw can be estimated in the range of 30-35 €/ha. 
  10 
Table 2. Sample size distribution 
Farms under AES  Farms not under AES 
County  N  %  Sample size  N  %  Sample size 
Guadix  188  49.1 59  829  33.9 55 
Baza  69  17.8 21  742  30.4 63 
Huéscar 131  33.1 40  874  35.8 62 
TOTAL  388  100.0 120  2,445  100.0 180 
Source: own calculations based on 1999 agricultural census and AES managing authority 
monitoring reports. 
 
The questionnaire was designed by the research team and field tested with 5 farmers 
before generating the final version. It included 70 questions and generates 310 variables. 
Farmers were randomly selected from the population in each strata (enrolled / non-
enrolled farmers in each municipality) and interviewed in their homes by two 
agronomists, the average interview lasted 45 minutes. The questionnaire gathered data 
regarding three main topics: a) farm basic data with special interest in cattle 
management, b) attitudes, opinion, knowledge and enrolment in AES and c) basic 
farmer socio-economic data.  
 
E. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Our dependant variable is of dichotomous nature (to enrol or not in the AES), thus 
the modelling approach used has been the logistic regression (Anemiya, 1985; 
Greene, 1997) where the independent variables will reflect both farm, farmer and 
market characteristics. The enrolment decision can be modelled as  
) ( 0 1
1
) 1 ( xi i i i e
x y E P β β + − +
= = =   [3]   
 
Where yi is a binary variable reflecting whether the farmer has enrolled the AES 
or not, xi are the independent variables reflecting the individual characteristics, β are the 
estimated model coefficients (including a constant). The model has to be estimated 
using maximum likelihood as OLS estimates are biased due to heterodasticity and non-
normality distribution of residuals (Cramer, 1991). The model results as well as the 
univariate descriptive statistics for the independent variables are shown in table 3.  
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Table 3. Adoption of EF AES model results 
 Logit  model  Variables  Description 
Variable Parameter 
Estimate (β) 
S.d P-value  Exp (β) Mean Max.  Min S.d 
Constant -5,622  1,344 0,000   -  -  -  - 
AGE 0,057  0,018 0,002  1,059  49,327  23  83  12,544
EDU  0,502  0,239 0,036 1,651 1,971  1  4 0,915 
INNOV  1,906  0,358 0,000 6,724 0,555  0  1 0,498 
GRAZE  -1,245  0,681 0,067 0,288 0,104  0  1 0,306 
ASO  0,580  0,334 0,083 1,785 0,427  0  1 0,496 
Number of observations = 211   
-2log likelihood null = 281,951 
-2log likelihood model = 222,603 
χ
2= 59.347  
Nagelkerke’s R
2 = 0,333 
Mc_Fadden R
2 = 0,210 
% of correct predictions = 75,4%  
p-value= 0.000 
 
Where AGE is farmer’s age; EDU reflects farmers education with four incremental 
levels (1=no formal education; 4=university education); INNOV is a binary variable 
reflecting farmers attitude towards new policy measures (1=innovative; 
0=precautions)
5; GRAZE is a binary variable that reflects whether farmer needs 
additional grazing area outside the farm and ASO is a binary variable reflecting whether 
the farmer belongs to a farmer association or not. Overall, assessed by the pseudo R
2 
measures and the % of correctly predicted observations the model is very significant. 
The model provides an improvement of 23 % with regards to a naïve model including 
only a constant as independent variable.  
Regarding the independent variables which have been included in the model, we 
will analyse them following the characterization presented in section C. As far as 
farmers’ characteristics are concerned significant effects have been detected for age, 
education and innovativeness. Related to farm characteristics, animal feed regime has 
been identified as having a significant impact
6. Last, and confirming the importance of 
                                                 
5 This variable is constructed from a question in the survey in which the farmer declared his willingness 
to adopt new proposals in farm management related to policy developments, the original to a four 
statement scale which have been recoded to reflect only those considering themselves “pioneers” (i.e. 
willing to adopt any development offered). 
6 This variable could also be related to market characteristics, as input market price for alternative feeding 
sources. As we have no spatial or time variation regarding this price we have decided to include it as a 
farm management characteristic.  
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organization”) in order to explain participation. 
Older farmers show a greater probability of participating in the AES. This finding 
supports the low-requirement character of the environmental fallow measure, with an 
effect similar to that detected by Potter and Lobley (1992) and Drake et al. (1999) for 
measures also implying minor changes in farm management. The positive effect related 
to education can be understood from the strong correlation that this variable has with 
the understanding of the AES requirement, so it’s the lack of knowledge regarding this 
measure what partially limits its adoption. This finding is further supported by the effect 
of ASO variable, as we can assume that farmers participating in professional bodies 
(such as farmer´s unions or cooperatives) have a better access to policy requirements. 
As stated in section C, farmers’ attitude to institutional innovation can have a positive or 
negative effect on AES enrolment. In our case, the influence is positive mainly due to 
risk issues (the measure cannot be considered innovative from a farm management point 
of view). Although the measure studied does not imply any risk in the market 
production crops, there is risk and uncertainty derived of the possibility of being 
sanctioned for not applying the measure correctly or a delay in the payments. The 
variable INNO is the one with the most significant marginal effect on the logit model as 
it is shown in the highest odd ratio (Exp (β)) value in table 3. 
One of the main restraints detected during the surveying was livestock load 
restrictions. This is confirmed by the effect of the GRAZE variable indicating that 
compensatory payments are not enough to cover the additional costs of paying for 
pasture outside the farm associated either with big herd sizes or 20% restriction on 
livestock load. This restriction also affects the possibility of benefiting from LFA 
compensation schemes in the case of full time farmers.  
 
E. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In order to improve the design of AES, evaluating factors influencing farmer’s 
enrolment decision is a key aspect. Moreover considering that in the New Rural 
Development Program 2007-13 (Council Regulation 1698/2005), Spain has chosen a 
de-centralized application leaving regional administration  a big degree of freedom 
when designing new measures (implementation plans are currently being drafted) in 
order to meet environmental needs with a higher degree of success. 
  13Besides the fact that the agri-environmental measure studied does not imply an 
important change in farm management (specially for those farmers which do not 
combine cereal production with ovine production) and therefore compensation is 
received for traditional farm management (Gonzalez de Molina, 2002), our results 
suggest that besides intrinsic factors related to the farm and farmer characteristics which 
can not be changed by AES
7, more attention should be paid to behavioural aspects and 
programme design. Farmer’s attitude can be influenced through education and 
extension, if measure knowledge is increased a higher uptake can be predicted. 
Therefore it is important to improve the social capital in both professional and non 
professional organizations to stimulate farmers to adopt sustainable farming practices. 
AES interaction with other policy measures, specially LFA compensation and ovine 
premiums, also constraint the capacity of AES to provide viable alternative to 
participating farms, a fact that must be taken into account when AES payments account 
only for a small portion of overall agricultural policy expenditure. In this case, farmers 
not participating requested on average an additional 33% premium in order to 
participate, a quantity affected by the existing LFA premiums. The new rural 
development regulation could allow changes in cross-compliance and policy resource 
intensity taking into account these findings.  
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